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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Equity-Discretion of Court to Deny Injunction Upon Cessation
of Violations of Price Control Act.--Hecht Company v. Bowles, (64
Sup. Ct. 587, 1944) was an action by Chester Bowles, as Price Ad-
ministrator of the Office of Price Administration, against the Hecht
Company for an injunction to restrain the defendant from violating
the Emergency Price Control Act and regulations promulgated
thereunder.
Sec. 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 19421 pro-
vides: "that whenever in the judgment of the administrator any
person has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices
which violate any provision of sec. 4 of this act, the administrator
may make application to the appropriate court for an injunction and
upon a showing by the administrator that such person has engaged or
is about to engage in any such acts or practices a permanent or tem-
porary injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted
without bond."
The alleged infractions by the Hecht Company were violative of
sec. 4(a) of the Act. The regulations provided: that no person shall
sell or deliver any commodity at a price higher than the authorized
maximum price as fixed by regulation, 2 existing records shall be pre-
served and examined,3 current sales records were required to be kept,4
and maximum prices should be fixed with the administrator. 5
The question in the case was: is the administrator, having estab-
lished that the defendant did engage in acts or practices violative of
sec. 4 of the Price Control Act, entitled as of right to an injunction
enjoining the defendant from engaging in such acts notwithstanding
that violations have been discontinued by the defendant, or has the
court discretion to withhold or to grant such relief?
It was clear that numerous violations both as respects prices and
records were revealed, that statements filed with the administrator
proved deficient, and that there were no records kept about many
items. The present suit was brought praying for an order enjoining
the Hecht Company from future violations of the regulations. The
Hecht Company pleaded that any failure or neglect to comply with
the regulations was involuntary and was corrected as soon as dis-
covered; as a corroboration of their good faith and diligence, the
Hecht Company attested to the fact that an inexperienced company
price control office, previously beset with many difficulties in attempt-
ing to interpret the regulations, had now been greatly expanded and
156 U. S. STAT. 23, 50 U.S.C.A. App. 901.
2 7 Fed. Reg. 3153, 1499.1.
3 7 Fed. Reg. 3153, 1499.11.
4 7 Fed. Reg. 3153, 1499.12.
5 7 Fed. Reg. 3153, 1499.13.
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internally reorganized; furthermore, the Company had sought to repay
all overcharges to customers indentifiable, and they propose to con-
tribute the amount of such overcharges to charity.
Nevertheless, the administrator insisted that the mandatory char-
acter of 205 (a) is clear from its language, history, and purpose. He
argued that "should be granted" is not permissive but mandatory
upon a showing of illegal practices. He urged that the senate report
in its analysis of 205 (a) had stricken the words "upon a proper show-
ing" and had replaced them with the words "upon a showing by the
administrator that such person has engaged or is about to engage in
any such acts or practices."'6 Such key phrases as "upon a proper
showing"27 and "for cause shown"81 which clearly indicated the re-
serve of discretion by the equity courts in other acts do not appear
in 205(a), and so the administrator insisted that Congress did wish
to make the issuance of an injunction mandatory upon application.
The Supreme Court held that the ambiguities of 205 (a) should
be resolved in favor of that interpretation which affords "a full op-
portunity for equity courts to treat enforcement proceedings under
this emergency legislation in accordance with their traditional prac-
tices as7 conditioned by the necessities of the public interest which
Congress has sought to protect." 9 It was held that the Act falls short
of making mandatory the issuance of an injunction merely because
the administrator asks it.
Decisions involving the Fair Labor Standard Act of 193810 are
in accord with the principal case, In Fleming v. National Bank of
Commerce" it was held that the Act providing that the District
Courts shall have jurisdiction for cause shown to restrain violations
of the Act does not mean that the court should automatically issue
an injunction in all cases where violations are shown; each case must
be measured according to its own circumstances. It does not follow
that the administrator is entitled to an injunction merely on a show-
ing of past violations. A decision given under the Norris La Guardia
Act12 held that an injunction will not be issued when the wrong is
fully terminated before the institution of the suit and where there is
no likelihood of repetition. 13 In still other instances, an injunction
6 S. Rep. No. 931, 77th. Cong. 2d. Sess., p. 25.
7 SECURITIES EXCHANGE Acr of 1934, 48 U.S. STAT. 899, 15 U.S.C.A. 78u(e).8 FAR LABOR STANDARD ACT, 52 U.S. STAT. 1069, 29 U.S.C.A. 217.
9 United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 59 Sup. Ct. 795, 83 L.Ed. 1211 (1939).
2o Supra, note 8.
11 Fleming v. National Bank of Commerce, 41 F. Supp. 833 (D.C. W.Va., 1941).
12NORRIS LA GUARDIA ACT, 29 U.S.C.A. 108.
13Yellow Cab Operating Co. v. Local Union, 35 F. Supp. 403 (D.C. S.D. N.Y.,
1940) ; United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 251 U.S. 417, 40 Sup.
Ct. 293, 64 L.Ed. 343, 343 A.L.R. 1121 (1920) ; Shore et al v. United States,
282 Fed. (2d) 857 (C.C.A. 7th, 1922); Blease v. Safety Transit Co., 50 Fed.(2d) 852 (C.C.A. 4th, 1931) ; Brookings State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank,
281 Fed. 222 (D.C. Oregon, 1922).
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was denied where the acts ceased and future violations were almost
certain not to occur. It was held that the question has then become
moot.14 In Fleming v. Phipps"5 the court said that there was no in-
dication within the act showing a Congressional intent which made
the issuance of an injunction mandatory. Under the Fair Labor
Standard Act the provisions for an injunction to restrain violations
and for the criminal prosecution were alternative remedies and an
injunction should not be granted unless there is adequate cause in
accordance with applicable principles of equity.
The court did hold in Walling v. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Company 6
that the cessation of violations shortly prior to the filing of suit con-
sidered alone is not a ground for denying an injunction. Apparently
permanent cessation of violations was not likely for the past conduct of
the defendant did not warrant such belief. In Fleming v. Salem Box
Company"I it was held that Congress does have the power to permit
the issuance of injunctions without the ordinary showing of irrepar-
able injury required by equity tribunals, and this is especially held
to be true where an agency of the government is given the right
to apply for an injunction in the public interest. A glance at tht
Securities Exchange Act and at the decision delivered in Security
and Exchange Co. v. Otis and Co.' will reveal that the court re-
garded the evidence presented as insufficient to warrant an injunction
on the ground that the defendant would commit future violations
of the Act if not enjoined.
The wording of the Securities Exchange Act, of the Fair Labor
Standard Act, and of the Emergency Price Control Act each contain
alternative remedies. The Prince Control Act provides that a per-
manent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order
shall be granted. If the remedies are set forth in the alternative
and if some order is deemed necessary, the court may use its discre-
tion as to the type of order which it shall grant.19 The cases cited
tend to show that the discretionary power of the court of equity
cannot be divested by implication. The statutory prohibition must
be so rigid as to prevent the application of any equitable doctrine.
Discretion as to how to act has not as yet been restricted by Congress
1' Walling v. Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co., 134 Fed. (2d) 395 (C.C.A. 10th,
1943); Walling v. T. Buettner and Co., 133 Fed. (2d) 306 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
15 Fleming.v. Phipps, 35 F. Supp. 627 (D.C. Md., 1940).
16 Walling 'v. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co., 94 F. Supp. 846 (D.C. La., 1943);
Holland v. Amoskeag Machinery Co.. 44 F. Supp. 884 (D.C. N.H., 1942);
Fleming v. Tidewater Optical Co., 35 F. Supp. 1015 (D.C. Va., 1940).
17 Fleming v. Salem Box Co., 38 F. Supp. 997 (D.C. Oregon, 1940); American
Fruit Growers v. United States, 105 Fed. (2d) 722 (C.C.A. 9th, 1939).
18 Securities and Exchange Co. v. Otis and Co., 18 F. Supp. 100 (D.C. S.D. N.Y.
1940).
19 Brown v. Southwest Hotels, 50 F. Supp. 147 (D.C. Ark., 1943).
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when the court was given the power to act at all. However, power
to act at all has been restricted by Congress. The Norris La Guardia
Act has restricted, the court to enjoin in circumstances designated in
the Act. The limiting of this power of the courts was held to be
a valid exercise of the power of Congress, 20 for Congress may within
fixed limits give either whole or restricted jurisdiction to the District
Courts."
MIcHEL J. PULITO
Pleading-Married Woman's Right to Sue in Her Own Name.-
Singer v. Singer (14 N.W. (2d) 43, Wisconsin 1944) was an action
by Angeline F. Singer, plaintiff, against Anthony A. Singer, Max
Singer, and Catherine Fuerstenburg, defendants, to recover for dam-
ages sustained by her as a result of a willful conspiracy among the
defendants, plaintiff's husband, his brother, and their employee.
Anthony A. Singer, the husband demurred to the complaint. From
an order sustaining the demurrer, the plaintiff appealed.
The court held that inasmuch as the statute 246.071 did not give
a married woman the right to maintain an action in her own name
other than for injury to person or character, or the alienation of her
husband's affections without joining him, she must sue in her hus-
band's name in an action for conspiracy to injure her marital rights;
and that as it was manifest that the husband could not be both
plaintiff and defendant in the same action, the cause of action for
conspiracy must fail.
The statute 6.0152 which gave women equal rights and privileges
was construed as to be limited by the earlier statute allowing women
20 nternational Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 305
U.S. 662, 59 Sup. Ct. 364, 83 L.Ed. 430 (1939).21293 U.S. 595, 55 Sup. Ct. 110, 79 L.Ed. 688 (1934).
1 WIs. STAT. § 246.07 "May sue in her own-name. Every married woman may
sue in her own name and shall have all the remedies of an unmarried woman
in regard to her separate property or business and to recover the earnings
secured to her by 246.05 and 246.06, and shall be liable to be sued in respect
to her separate property or business, and judgment may be rendered against
her and be enforced against her and her separate property in all respects as
if she were unmarried. And any married woman may bring and maintain an
action in her own name for any injury to her person or character the same
as if she were sole. She may also bring and maintain an action in her own
name and for her own benefit, for the alienation and the loss of the affection
and society of her husband. Any judgment recovered in any such action shall
be the separate property and estate of such married woman. Nothing herein
contained shall affect the right of the husband to maintain a separate action
for any such injuries as are now provided by law."
2 WIs. STAT. § 6.015 "Women to have equal rights. (1) Women shall have the
same rights and privileges under the law as men in the exercise of suffrage,
freedom of contract, choice of residence for voting purposes, jury service,
holding office, holding and conveying property, care and custody of children,
and in all other respects. The various courts, executive and administrative
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